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If art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society must set the artist
free to follow his vision wherever it takes him.
-John Fitzgerald Kennedy'
I. INTRODUCTION
FTER relinquishing a work of art's copyright, artists have gen-
erally been without recourse with respect to the fate of that work
in the United States. Copyright law traditionally protects an art-
ist's work from economic exploitation only. Many countries, most nota-
bly France, have recognized in their copyright laws droit moral, or moral
rights, which are distinct from economic rights.2 Moral rights are gener-
* This paper was chosen for entry in the 1994 Nathan Burkan Memorial National
competition.
1. AsHTON APPLEWHITE ET AL., AND I QuoTE 288 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Compari-
son of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980);
Christine L. Chinni, Droit d'Auteur Versus the Economics of Copyright: Implications for
American Law of Accession to the Berne Convention, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 145 (1992);
Jeff C. Schneider, Note, Recently Enacted Federal Legislation Providing Moral Rights to
Visual Artists: A Critical Analysis, 43 FLA. L. REv. 101 (1991); see also ANDRt LUCAS &
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ally considered to stay with the artist even after the economic rights are
sold. The recognition of moral rights in the United States has been lim-
ited, with most protection being found outside of copyright law. The
passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), however, ex-
panded moral rights protection for at least a limited group of artists.
Part two of this paper will overview the protection of moral rights in
copyright law, focusing particularly on VARA and pre-VARA United
States case law. Part three will address some of the areas of VARA that
are open to interpretation and controversy. While this paper does not
purport to set forth all areas of controversy, three will be addressed: the
political controversy still surrounding VARA; some of the interpretation
issues that may arise; and the effect of VARA's waiver provision on the
moral rights provided by VARA. The primary focus in part three will be
on the waiver provision.
II. PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS
A. BERNE CONVENTION
In 1988, the United States acceded to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.3 The Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 19884 (BCIA) was signed into law by President Rea-
gan on October 31, 1988. The Berne Convention and the BCIA both
became effective in the United States on March 1, 1989. The United
States decision to join the Berne Convention was based in large part on
the insufficiency of existing international copyright protection, the desire
to increase international negotiating leverage, and the need to fight copy-
right piracy.5
The Berne Convention, in Article 6bis,6 provides moral rights protec-
tion to all literary and artistic works. Article 6bis provides that:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 7
Existing United States copyright law at the time of BCIA did not provide
moral rights protection as required by article 6bis, nor did BCIA provide
ROBERT PLAISANT, 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, France ch. (Mel-
ville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1994) (analyzing French copyright law and
moral right protection).
3. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886 (last revised July 24, 1971), reprinted in WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris Act, 1971) (1978) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
4. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
5. David M. Spector, Implications of United States Adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion, 17 AIPLA Q. J. 100, 105-06 (1989).
6. Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bis(1), at 41.
7. Id.
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for moral rights protection. The language of article 6bis certainly appears
to create an obstacle to United States compliance with the Berne Con-
vention. Congress stressed, however, that the Berne Convention was not
self-executing, 8 and resolved the issue by claiming that United States law
already complied with article 6bis protection of moral rights through ex-
isting state and federal law. 9 The Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives found that "existing law is sufficient to enable
the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention, the implementing
legislation is completely neutral on the issue of whether and how protec-
tion of the rights of paternity and integrity should develop in the fu-
ture."'10 Moreover, Senator Hatch stated that "while existing U.S. law
satisfies U.S. obligations under article 6bis of Berne, our judicial system
has consistently rejected causes of action denominated as 'moral rights'
or arising under the moral rights doctrine."" Senator Hatch's self-con-
tradictory statement suggests that Congress, in an effort to meet merely
the letter of the Berne Convention, speciously bootstrapped moral rights
protection into existing U.S. law.
B. VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTs Acr OF 1990
Endeavors in Congress to protect an artist's moral rights began
before 12 and continued after 13 adoption of the Berne Convention. These
efforts culminated in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.14 Although
commentators argue that VARA does not provide enough protection and
does not bring the United States into full compliance with the Berne
8. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3706, 3735.
9. 134 CONG. REc. 28,302 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Congress stated
that:
This existing U.S. law includes various provisions of the Copyright Act and
Lanham Act, various state statutes, and common law principles such as libel,
defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair competition, which have been ap-
plied by courts to redress authors' invocation of the right to claim authorship
or the right to object to distortion.
S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,
3714-15. See infra notes 60-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of moral rights case
law in the United States prior to VARA.
10. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1988).
11. 134 CONG. REC. 28,306 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch cited the
cases of Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164
F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Shostakovich [sic] v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Id. The Senator's statement on the status of moral rights protection in
U.S. law was oversimplified and one-sided. See infra notes 60-117 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, claiming that the U.S. complies with Article 6bis of Berne, while stating that
the U.S. does not recognize the moral rights doctrine, is obviously incongruent.
12. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6918. Bills attempting to protect artists' moral rights date back to 1979. Id.
13. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 was introduced by Senator Kennedy and
Representative Kastenmeier. Id at 5-6, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915-16.
14. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-10, 104 Stat. 5128(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VARA].
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Convention,' 5 it is generally acknowledged that VARA represents a big
step towards protection of artists' moral rights. 16 This is particularly true
when the limited political clout of artists is considered.' 7
The protection provided by VARA does not encompass all literary and
artistic works, as required by article 6bis of the Berne Convention.' 8 In-
stead, protection is limited to works of visual art and more specifically to
works of 'fine art.' 19 Many works that are certainly visual in nature but
are not in the realm of fine art are specifically excluded as works of visual
art.20 VARA further excludes from moral rights protection works made
for hire and works not subject to copyright protection.2'
VARA provides the moral rights of attribution and integrity.22 The
author of a work, even if not the copyright owner, retains these rights.23
Joint authors are considered coowners of all rights conferred by the stat-
ute. 24 The moral rights for all works created after the effective date of
VARA last for the life of the author, or if a joint work, for the life of the
last surviving author.25 The Berne Convention, however, clearly requires
15. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Fed-
eral System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATm. U. L. REv. 945, 996 (1990).
16. Id. at 947, 998.
17. Id. at 998.
18. Id. at 947.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993). A 'work of visual art' is defined as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a lim-
ited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of two hundred or fewer that are consecutively num-
bered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the
author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.
Id.
20. Id. The statute specifically excludes as a work of visual art:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, ap-
plied art, motion picture, or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, news-
paper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandizing item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cov-
ering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
lId
21. Id.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (Supp. V 1993).
24. Id.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (Supp. V 1993).
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that moral rights last as long as economic rights,26 which in the U.S. is
generally fifty years.27
The right of attribution enables an artist to claim authorship of his or
her work,28 to preclude the use of the artists' names as author if not the
creator of the work,29 and to disavow authorship of a work that has been
distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified if prejudice to the author's
honor or reputation would otherwise result.30 The right of integrity en-
ables an artist to prevent distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
his or her work if done intentionally and if it would be prejudicial to the
artist's honor or reputation.31 The prejudice intended by Congress was to
the artist's professional, not personal, honor or reputation.32 Destruction
of a work can be prevented by an artist only if the work is of recognized
stature and the destruction is either intentional or grossly negligent.
33
There are several exceptions to the rights of integrity and attribution
afforded by VARA. Modifications resulting from the passage of time or
from the intrinsic nature of the materials used are not covered by the
statute's right of integrity.34 Moreover, acts performed during conserva-
tion or public presentation of a work are not destructions, distortions,
mutilations, or other modifications under VARA's right of integrity un-
less the modification results from gross negligence.35 The rights of attri-
bution and integrity do not apply to reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or
other use of an otherwise protected work when used in connection with
those works specifically excluded from works of art under 17 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 101 (A). 36
VARA further provides that the moral rights given the artist may not
be transferred but may be waived. 37 Any waiver, however, must be ex-
press, in writing, and very specific as to the work and uses of that work
26. Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bis. para. 2, at 43. The second paragraph of
art. 6bis provides that:
The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic
rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by
the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). Terms are different for anonymous works, pseudony-
mous works, and works for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(2) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
32. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6925.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993). See supra note 20 for the text of 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(A).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. V 1993).
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which are waived. 38 A single author may waive the rights for all authors
of a joint work.39
VARA also provides a rather complicated set of rules governing re-
moval of works from buildings.40 If removal of a work will harm or in
some way modify the work, the building owner is free to remove it only if
the author agreed to the installation of the work on the building prior to
the effective date of VARA or if the owner and the author agree in writ-
ing that future removal may harm or modify the work.41 In the case
where removal is possible without damaging the work, the author's rights
of integrity and attribution apply unless the building owner has made a
diligent, good faith effort to notify the artist or if within 90 days of notifi-
cation the artist does not remove or pay to remove the work.42 VARA
further requires that the copyright office set up a recording system to
facilitate notification.4 3
"[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights
conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art" are pre-
empted by VARA.44 "Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any work of visual art under the common law or
statutes of any State."'45 This is not true for lawsuits begun before the
effective date of the legislation. 46 Furthermore, any rights, legal or equi-
table, that are not equivalent to those of Section 106A 47 or which extend
beyond the life of the author48 are not preempted. Therefore, state com-
mon law and statutory protection of a work which is not covered by
VARA, or of rights which are not provided by VARA, are not pre-
empted. 49 The preemption provision can therefore result in greater or
lesser protection for an artist's work depending on the state involved. 50
The purpose of this provision is, of course, to provide a uniform, national
system of protection.51
Additional provisions of VARA provide the remedies available for in-
fringement,52 address the effect of the fair use doctrine on an artist's
38. Id. See infra notes 200-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the VARA
waiver provision.
39. Id.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. V 1993).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1) (Supp. V 1993).
45. Id.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
49. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6931.
50. See Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990- What It Does, and What
It Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445 (1992) (discussing the effects of the preemption provision,
focusing especially on the California and New York statutes).
51. H.R. REp. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6934.
52. VARA, supra note 14, § 606.
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moral rights,53 and provide for future studies required by the Copyright
Office. 54 More specifically, an artist suing under Section 106A is gener-
ally entitled to the remedies normally provided in a copyright infringe-
ment case,55 with the exception that criminal penalties are not available.56
Moreover, Section 106A rights, like other copyright rights, are limited by
the fair use doctrine. 57 Congress further required in VARA that the
Copyright Office conduct studies on the waiver of rights provision of Sec-
tion 106A 58 and a study of the feasibility of a resale royalty
requirement.59
C. PRE-VARA MORAL RIGHrs PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Although the concept of moral rights has been acknowledged in the
United States for many years, case law on the subject is limited and
courts have been reluctant to recognize artists' moral rights in their work.
Legal theories used by artists in an effort to exact moral rights protection
include copyright, the Lanham Act,6° contract, unfair competition, defa-
mation, and right to privacy. 61 Some commentators have even suggested
theories such as the doctrine of waste.62 These theories and cases are still
important today, even after the passage of VARA, because many artistic
works are not protected by VARA. Therefore, the only place for many
artists to turn is still outside copyright law, particularly when the artist has
not retained the copyright to the work. Most of these theories, however,
have met with only limited success.
Courts have generally been disinclined to apply moral rights to an au-
thor's work. For example, in the 1948 case of Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp.,63 the court found that the use of the plaintiffs'
uncopyrighted music in a film, although objectionable to the plaintiffs,
was not a violation of the composers' moral rights.64 The court did, how-
ever, acknowledge that "under the doctrine of Moral Right the court
could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or work, in the
public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the author's
53. VARA, supra note 14, § 607.
54. VARA, supra note 14, § 608.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1993).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 506(f) (Supp. V 1993).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. V 1993). The fair use doctrine provides that "the fair use of
a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not in infringe-
ment of copyright." Id.
58. VARA, supra note 14, § 608(a). See infra notes 212-65 and accompanying text for
discussion of the December 1, 1992 Interim Report of the Register of Copyrights.
59. VARA, supra note 14, § 608(b).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993).
61. See, e.g., Timothy M. Casey, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act, 14 HASINGS
COMM. & ENr. L.J. 85 (1991).
62. 1&
63. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
64. Id. at 578. The court reasoned that, since the music was used in undistorted form
and the theme of the film did not concern the plaintiffs, moral rights were not implicated.Id.
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rights."'65 The court went on to express its concern over the application
of the doctrine and the undefined state of this right in the law.66
The courts appear even less inclined today to acknowledge moral rights
protection. The increased reluctance is illustrated in the 1989 case of Par-
amount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broadcasting Systems, Inc.67 In Para-
mount, the court found that the defendant's placement of local
advertisements on videocassettes containing plaintiff's films was not a vi-
olation of either copyright law68 or the Lanham Act.69 In addressing
cases which had recognized an artist's moral rights,70 the court opined
that it was reluctant to extend those cases' holdings beyond their control-
ling facts because no express moral rights were recognized in statutory
copyright law and moral rights development in United States courts had
been slow.71 The court did at least suggest, however, that in limited cases
moral rights might be an issue.72 This is evidenced by the court's state-
ment that the case at hand was "not a case where the equities so obvi-
ously favor the copyright owner that the court must struggle with the
notion of 'moral rights.' ,,73
An artist's right to integrity in his or her work was recognized in the
leading case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.74 The
Gilliam court provided relief to the artists under theories of copyright 75
and Lanham Act 76 violations. The court clearly viewed the protection of
an artist's work as important.77 The court frankly acknowledged the fail-
ure of American copyright law in the protection of an artist's right to
integrity in a work and referred to efforts made by courts to provide pro-
tection under alternate theories.78 The court failed to acknowledge, how-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 579.
67. 724 F. Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
68. Id. at 821.
69. Id. at 819.
70. See WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1982); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
71. Paramount, 724 F. Supp. at 819.
72. Id. at 820.
73. Id.
74. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
75. Id at 23.
76. Id. at 25.
77. Id. at 23. The court stated:
Our resolution of these technical arguments serves to reinforce our initial
inclination that the copyright law should be used to recognize the important
role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage production and
dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for
one who submits his or her work to the public.
Id.
78. Id. at 24. The court stated that:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to
vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors. Never-
theless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled
[Vol. 48
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ever, the limited extent to which United States courts have actually
provided protection.
In Gilliam, the British comedy group Monty Python sued the broadcast
company ABC, requesting a preliminary injunction to restrain ABC from
broadcasting edited versions of Monty Python's programs. ABC, in
broadcasting a ninety minute special consisting of three thirty minute
programs, cut twenty-four minutes of the artists' work in order to insert
commercials and remove material they found to be offensive or obscene.
The district court found that the removal resulted in an impairment of the
work's integrity which resulted in a loss of the program's "iconoclastic
verve."'79 The district court judge, however, provided only limited relief.
With respect to the broadcast of a second special, the district court re-
quired that a disclaimer be broadcast during the second special stating
that, because of the editing, the Monty Python group dissociated them-
selves from the program.80 The court of appeals, however, ordered the
issuance of a preliminary injunction against the rebroadcast of the pro-
grams, pending final resolution of the issues which they made clear could
result in a permanent injunction. 81
Time-Life Films provided the programs to ABC through an arrange-
ment with the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). The Monty Python
programs were originally written and performed for broadcast by the
BBC. An agreement between Monty Python and the BBC provided a
very detailed procedure for making alterations in the script before re-
cording, but was silent with respect to alteration after the program had
been recorded.82 The agreement further provided that Monty Python re-
tained the copyright to the scripts.83 Moreover, the BBC was allowed to
license transmission of the programs in any overseas territory. 84
Since Monty Python retained the copyright to the scripts, they were
able to maintain a cause of action under copyright law. The court stated
that even if the BBC owned the copyright of the recorded program, it was
a derivative work of the script and therefore limited to the novel addi-
tions made to the underlying work.85 Therefore, even if the BBC had
agreed to allow the editing, it could not convey any rights greater than it
owned.8 6 The court concluded "that unauthorized editing of the underly-
with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresenta-
tion of their work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent.
Thus courts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work
by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright ....
Id (citations omitted).
79. Id at 18. The court of appeals found that "the truncated version at times omitted
the climax of the skits to which appellants' rare brand of humor was leading and at other
times deleted essential elements in the schematic development of a story line." Id. at 25.
80. Id
81. Id at 26.
82. Id at 17 n.2.
83. Id at 17.
84. Id
85. Id. at 19-20.
86. Id. at 21.
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ing work.., would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that
work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the license granted
by the proprietor of the copyright. ' 87 The court added that, although a
small degree of editing might be allowable, the editing in this case was
too extensive, particularly in view of the contractual provisions limiting
the right to edit the scripts.88
Monty Python was also successful under a Lanham Act section 43(a) 89
cause of action, 90 providing some hope to artists that have been unable to
retain the copyright to their work. An analogous cause of action may be
found in state unfair competition laws.91 The Lanham Act, although a
trademark statute, "has been invoked to prevent misrepresentations that
may injure plaintiff's business or personal reputation, even where no reg-
istered trademark is concerned. '92 Therefore, the court reasoned that
when an artist alleges that a distorted version of that artist's work has
been presented to the public by a defendant, the artist is seeking "to re-
dress the very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act [section
43(a)] ... and should be recognized as stating a cause of action under that
statute. '93 Although the Lanham Act may be used to provide protection
to an artist, the fact that protection must be sought under a trademark
statute illustrates a glaring gap in copyright law.
In Zim v. Western Publishing Co.94 an author was successful in a claim
against his publisher for unauthorized and wrongful appropriation 95 of
his name when he had not approved revisions. The plaintiff brought a
tort claim based on a common law right to privacy recognized in that
jurisdiction.96 The court stated that the use of Zim's name for commer-
cial purposes was his to control97 and acknowledged this as "the first form
of the right of privacy to be recognized by the courts." 98 Zim was not
successful, however, with respect to all of the works. The use of Zim's
name was found to be tortious only when the use was in breach of
contract. 99
Artist Alberto Vargas's lawsuit, involving drawings made under a con-
tractual agreement for publication by Esquire magazine, was not success-
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id at 23.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993).
90. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25.
91. Id at 24.
92. Id. The current language of Lanham Act § 43 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1993).
93. Glliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25.
94. 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978). Judge Goldberg set forth the facts of the case in a
rather clever and entertaining way, framing the case in terms of the story of the earth's
creation from Genesis. Id at 1320-21.
95. Id. at 1326.
96. Id. The jurisdiction in Zim was Florida which recognized a common law right to
privacy in Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). Id.
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ful.100 Vargas attempted to advance three theories: an implied agreement
between the parties,' 0 moral rights, 102 and misrepresentation and unfair
competition. 103 The court flatly rejected all three theories. The court re-
fused to imply a condition to the contract, finding that Vargas contractu-
ally relinquished all interests in the drawings and the names associated
with the drawings. 104 The concept of moral rights was summarily rejected
by the court:
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to
conform to that of certain other countries. We need not stop to in-
quire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legisla-
tive or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not
disposed to make any new law in this respect.' 05
The plaintiff fared no better with his misrepresentation and unfair compe-
tition claims. The court again relied on the contract to hold that the artist
had given up all rights with respect to the drawings.'0 6
The approach in Vargas10 7 was followed by a New York court when the
mural painter Alfred D. Crimi attempted to seek relief when a church
unceremoniously painted over his fresco, which they had commissioned
eight years earlier. 108 The plaintiff asserted that, based on the custom
and usage of the trade, the work would "not be altered, mutilated, oblit-
erated or destroyed."' 0 9 The court determined that the mural was part of
the real estate of the church.1 0 Therefore, based on real property law,
any interest that arose by custom and usage must be in writing."' Crimi
further asserted that he maintained a limited proprietary interest in the
work after its sale "to the extent reasonably necessary to the protection
of his honor and reputation as an artist.""12 The court rejected Crimi's
arguments, holding that an artist does not retain any rights, with respect
100. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). Esquire had contracted with
the artist to provide drawings which were published under the title of 'Varga Girls' and
bore the name of the plaintiff. After expiration of the contract the drawings were repro-
duced under the title 'The Esquire Girl' and the artist's name was omitted. Id. at 524.
101. Id. at 525.
102. Id. at 526.
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id. The court's attitude towards moral rights protection is clear from the begin-
ning of their discussion of the issue. The court begins:
Plaintiff advances another theory which needs little discussion. It is predi-
cated upon the contention that there is a distinction between the economic
rights of an author capable of assignment and what are called 'moral rights'
of the author, said to be those necessary for the protection of his honor and
integrity. These so-called 'moral rights,' so we are informed, are recognized
by the civil law of certain foreign countries.
Id.
106. Id. at 526-27.
107. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
108. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
109. Id. at 816.
110. Id at 819.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 816.
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to his artistic reputation, when a work is unconditionally sold. 113 The
court made clear that if an artist wants to retain any rights in his work,
the rights must be reserved by the terms of the contract. 1 4 Adding insult
to injury, the court further opined that, even if Berne Convention moral
rights applied in the United States, "[t]he right to prevent deformation
does not include the right to prevent destruction.""l15 As a result of this
decision, an artistic creation was forced to lie unseen under a coat of drab
wall paint.
Perusal of the above discussed and similar cases reveals a common de-
nominator. The artists who were afforded some relief either owned the
copyright to the work or had contractual provisions which provided pro-
tection. Although some courts have acknowledged the existence of other
causes of action, they seem reluctant to rely strictly on such alternate
methods of protection, instead looking for more traditional contract pro-
tection. Even in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.1 6 where
the court's language was very supportive of moral rights protection for
artists, the court ultimately relied on the contract and Monty Python's
ownership of the copyright.
Moreover, of the above discussed cases only Crimi'1 7 would qualify for
protection under VARA. Most of the cases in this area involve writers,
musicians, or film and movie personnel, none of whom are afforded any
protection under VARA. The reasons why there are not more cases in-
volving works of 'fine art' are not clear. Is it because most creators of
'fine art' are not in the position to afford litigation, or do these artists just
not have the bargaining power to negotiate contracts that protect their
interests, or do they just not experience the same problems as artists in
other areas do? These are not questions that are easily answered. One
thing is clear-many artists must still depend on common law, state statu-
tory law and federal law outside of copyright law to assert any rights to
attribution or integrity in their work.
D. CASE LAW UNDER VARA
Case law interpreting VARA is minimal. There appear to be only
three published cases where VARA was asserted. In Gegenhuber v. Hys-
topolis Productions, Inc." 8 the defendant claimed preemption of plain-
tiffs' state law claims based on VARA. The works in question, plaintiffs'
contributions to a puppet show, were held not protected works under
VARA. 119 The court opined that if Congress had intended to cover
works such as sets, puppets, and costumes Congress would have included
them in VARA, particularly in view of the extensive nature of the defini-
113. Id at 819.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 816.
116. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
118. No. 92 C 1055, 1992 WL 168836 (N.D. I11. July 13, 1992).
119. Id. at *4.
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tion of visual art in VARA. 120 Because plaintiffs' claim to a right of attri-
bution was not covered by VARA, the state law claims asserted by
plaintiffs were not preempted. 12'
In Moncada v. Rubin-Spangle Gallery, Inc.122 the plaintiff painted a
wall mural on a building with the permission of the tenant. One of the
defendants, an owner of a gallery directly across from the painted wall,
supervised an employee painting over the wall the day after the mural
was completed. The plaintiff endeavored to videotape the act, and the
defendant attempted to stop him. Plaintiff claimed a violation of VARA,
conversion, malicious assault, and interference with copyright. The only
ruling made regarding the case was on a motion to dismiss the third party
complaint against the gallery's insurance company. 123 While Mr. Mon-
cada may have had a potentially successful VARA claim, a court will
never address the merits because the case settled.124
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently
took the first substantive look at VARA. 125 The case involved an ongo-
ing sculptural work installed in a building lobby. The sculptors sued the
managing agent and the owner of the building after the sculptors had
been ordered to leave the building, and defendants' agent suggested that
the sculptural work would be altered or removed.
The plaintiffs entered into a contract with the managing agent of the
buildings's tenant in December 1991 to design sculpture for the building
lobby. On March 31, 1994 the tenant's lease was terminated. Defendant
Hehnsley-Spear, Inc. became managing agent of the building on April 6,
1994 and barred the plaintiffs from the property on April 7, 1994.
The plaintiff's primary claim was violation of VARA.126 The defend-
ants responded by alleging that the sculpture at issue was not protected
by VARA because: (1) the work was not a covered work of visual art;1 2 7
(2) the work was a work made for hire;128 (3) the plaintiffs' honor or
reputation would not be prejudiced by distortion, mutilation, or modifica-
tion of the work; 129 and (4) the work was not of recognized stature and
120. Id. at *4. The plaintiffs did not claim authorship rights in the play. Id. at *5 n.5.
Instead the plaintiffs claimed creative contribution rights to the puppet show, including
performance, design, construction, and production contributions. Id. at *2. The court fur-
ther opined that the performance of the puppet show was not included under VARA's
coverage by its plain language. Id. at *4.
121. Id. at *5.
122. 835 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
123. Id. at 750. The court determined that the insurance company was not liable for the
occurrence, therefore they had no duty to defend the action for the defendant. Id.
124. Telephone interview with Paul H. Appel, Attorney for plaintiff (Feb. 17, 1994).
Mr. Appel stated that the case had been settled. The merits of the case were not discussed.
The opinions regarding the merits are attributable to the author.
125. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
126. Id. at 313. Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully claimed copyright infringement, tortious
interference with contract, and unlawful ejection from real property. Id at 331-34.
127. Id. at 314.
128. Id at 316.
129. Id at 324.
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therefore could be destroyed.' 30 The defendants further argued that if
VARA protected the work at issue, the result would be an unconstitu-
tional taking under the Fifth Amendment.' 3 ' The court, trying the case
without a jury, addressed each issue in turn. 32
The defendants first argued that the plaintiffs' work was not entitled to
the protection provided by VARA. Specifically, the defendants alleged
that the work incorporated elements of applied art.133 The court found,
however, that as a whole the work was not applied art. 134 Based on legis-
lative history and the language of VARA, the court opined that VARA
does not prohibit protection for "works of visual art that incorporated
elements of, rather that constitute, applied art."'1 35
In their effort to remove plaintiffs' work from VARA protection, de-
fendants further alleged that, because plaintiffs' were employees, the
work was a "work made for hire."'1 36 A work made within the scope of
employment by an employee is a "work made for hire" under the defini-
tion provided in the Copyright Act.137 Moreover, a "work made for hire"
is specifically excluded from protection of VARA. 138 Therefore, if plain-
tiffs were employees their work is outside VARA protection. After
weighing the relevant factors, however, the court found that the plaintiffs'
work was not a "work made for hire."'139
Because the court found plaintiffs' work to be a work of visual art
within the coverage of VARA, it next analyzed whether VARA protected
the work from modification, distortion, or mutilation under the statute 40
Under VARA the work is protected from "intentional distortion, mutila-
tion, or... modification" only if such action "would be prejudicial to [the
plaintiffs'] honor or reputation.' 141 Because the statute does not define
"prejudicial," "honor," or "reputation," the court looked to the well-es-
130. Id. at 326.
131. Id. Defendants also unsuccessfully counterclaimed alleging waste. Id. at 334-35.
132. The court first looked at the work to determine if it was a single work of art or
several works of art which must be treated individually under VARA. Id. at 314. Judge
Edelstein found that, except for "the 'building directory,' the 'entrance steps 31st Street
entrance,' and [most of] the ceiling and wall lighting," the plaintiffs' work was a single work
of art. Id. at 315.
133. Id. at 315. Applied art involves two-dimensional and three-dimensional "orna-
mentation or decoration" attached to utilitarian objects. Id. While the Copyright Act pro-
vides no definition of applied art, it is excluded from VARA protection. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (Supp. V 1993).
134. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 316.
135. Id. at 315.
136. Id at 316.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993).
138. Id.
139. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 322. Analysis of the factors relevant for determining if a
work is a "work made for hire" is beyond the scope of this comment. The factors were
enumerated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The
weight to be given these factors was addressed in Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.
1992). Carter provides a good discussion of Reid, Aymes, and the "work made for hire"
factors. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 316-22.
140. Id. at 323-24.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
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tablished principle of statutory construction that the plain meaning of
words should apply unless the result is clearly outside the intent of Con-
gress.142 Accordingly, the court interpreted the statutory language to re-
quire determination of "whether such alteration would cause injury or
damage to plaintiffs' good name, public esteem, or reputation in the artis-
tic community."' 143 Moreover, relying on legislative history, the court
stated that there is no requirement "that the artists' reputation be derived
independently of the art work that is the subject of this dispute."'"4 After
establishment of the required standard, analysis of the prejudice to an
artist's honor or reputation ultimately came down to a battle of credibility
and experts.145 The court weighed the evidence and held that plaintiffs'
honor and reputation would be damaged if the work was distorted, muti-
lated or modified. 146
The court next looked to whether the work was protected from de-
struction under the statute. 47 For protection from destruction under
VARA, a work must be of "recognized stature.' 48 As with previously
discussed terms used in the statute, VARA does not define the term "rec-
ognized stature." Based on the "preservative goal" of the statute, the
court looked at this requirement as a "gate-keeping mechanism," used in
part to avoid nuisance suits. 149 In light of the purpose and plain meaning
of this section of the statute, the court found that "a plaintiff must make a
two-tiered showing: (1) that the visual art is question has 'stature,' i.e. is
viewed as meritorious, and (2) that this stature is 'recognized' by art ex-
perts, other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section
of society."' 50 The court stressed, however, that a plaintiff need not es-
tablish that the work is of a stature equal to artists such as "Picasso, Cha-
gall, or Giacometti.' 51 Success on the recognized stature requirement,
much like the prejudice to honor or reputation requirement discussed
above, depends essentially on expert witnesses and credibility. After ana-
lyzing testimony on the issue, the court held that the work was a work of
recognized stature. 152
Defendants also argued that VARA was unconstitutional if it protected
plaintiffs' work.' 53 In defendants' view, VARA affords third party con-
trol and permanent occupancy of their property, constituting an imper-
missible taking under the Fifth Amendment. Noting that congressional
statutes are presumed to be constitutional, the court makes clear that the
142. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 323.
143. Id
144. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925).
145. Id at 323-24.
146. Id at 324.
147. Id. at 324-26.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
149. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Id. at 325-26.
153. Id at 327.
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defendant faces a heavy burden in this argument. The court found de-
fendants' constitutional claim meritless.154 In so finding, the court pro-
vided many reasons why VARA is constitutional including: VARA
applies only to works installed after the statute's effective date; property
value is not necessarily diminished and may be enhanced by VARA pro-
tection of a work on that property; any impact is temporary since VARA
protection is in effect only for the lifespan of the last surviving artist of a
covered work; and VARA is formulated to advance the public interest.
155
The plaintiffs requested an injunction, damages, costs, and attorneys'
fees. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to pre-
vent distortion, mutilation, modification, or destruction of the work.'
56
The work also could not be removed from the building since portions
would be destroyed if removed.' 57 Plaintiffs were not entitled, however,
to complete or continue creating the work.' 58 Moreover, since no viola-
tion of VARA rights had yet occurred, plaintiffs could not recover dam-
ages on their claim. Additionally, the court found, in its discretion, that
awarding costs and attorney's fees would be inappropriate in this case.'
59
Presently, the meaning of VARA and the extent of its protection are
unclear. Many unanswered questions remain. As the case law develops,
interpretation of VARA should answer questions and resolve controver-
sies. Of course, new controversies will almost certainly be identified dur-
ing this interpretive process.
III. CONTROVERSY AND VARA
A. OVERVIEW
Controversy over moral rights continues to rage in the context of
VARA. The controversies range from practical considerations, such as
exactly what the meaning or effect of a provision of the law will be, to
political issues raised by those who are against the law and/or its expan-
sion. Practical concerns over VARA include the meaning of certain
words and phrases in the law' 60 and the potential effect of the waiver
provision on the rights afforded by VARA.' 6' Those whose interests
154. Id. at 329.
155. Id. at 328.
156. Id. at 329.
157. Id. A work of visual art incorporated into a building after the effective date of
VARA can not be removed if to do so would result in the "destruction, mutilation, distor-
tion, or other modification of the work," unless such removal is agreed to in writing by the
building owner and the artist. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
158. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
159. Id. at 330. Carter is presently on appeal to the Second Circuit. Oral arguments
were heard on March 15, 1995. This will be the first appellate court to address VARA.
Quite possibly, however, the court may look at the somewhat unusual "work made for
hire" issue and never reach the more substantive VARA holdings of the district court.
David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Visual Artists' Moral Rights Headed for Second
Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1995, at 3.
160. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. See infra notes 200-85 and accom-
panying text.
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would be harmed by expansion of moral rights to other artistic areas re-
main vocal on the subject and continue to point out the limited coverage
intended by VARA. 162 Others lament the passage of VARA as errone-
ous on grounds such as private property and First Amendment free
speech rights. 1 6 3 As is often true, and aptly suggested by a commentator,
"it is where moral and economic rights clash that the most intense contro-
versy erupts."' 64
Commentators who support moral rights protection for artists are gen-
erally in favor of expansion of these rights beyond the narrow confines of
VARA.165 It has been suggested, however, that the political and eco-
nomic realities that led to the exclusion of all but a limited group of
works from VARA make it unlikely that moral rights protection will be
expanded to those excluded works.166 This is evidenced by the congres-
sional debates over colorization of motion pictures. 67 One commentator
submits, however, that "greater rights with respect to works that do have
substantial economic potential is precisely what authors need [in order]
to bargain more effectively with those who package and disseminate their
works."168
Commentators urge that both artists and the public are benefitted by
the preservation of works of art. 169 Furthermore, VARA represents a
huge step into an arena much more common to Europe and unique to the
concepts of property law traditionally followed in the United States.170
Close scrutiny of the effects of VARA will be required to determine if
this is an isolated law or a stepping stone for the extension of moral rights
protection to a broader group of artists.' 7' Many commentators are opti-
mistic, at least cautiously, about the future of moral rights protection for
artistic works in the United States.172 For example, John B. Koegel, a
162. See Michael R. Klipper & John B. Glicksman, Berne Measure Doesn't Incorporate
New Moral Rights Into U.S. Law, Legal Times, Dec. 24, 1990, at 19. The authors represent
the Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC). The CACC opposes com-
prehensive moral rights legislation, but took no position on VARA. A broad range of
producers of copyrighted materials, including but not limited to printed materials, com-
puter software, motion pictures, broadcasting, sound recordings, and educational testing
are represented by CACC. The CACC also responded to the Copyright Office Request for
Information on the Waiver Provision of VARA. Instead of providing information useful to
the study, however, they urged the Copyright Office to properly focus on the narrow area
of art covered by VARA. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
163. See George C. Smith, Artistic License Takes On A New Meaning, LEGAL TIMEs,
Dec. 17, 1990, at 23.
164. Charles D. Ossola, Law for Art's Sake, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 27, 29.
165. Id at 27; Damich, supra note 15, at 996.
166. Ossola, supra note 164, at 27.
167. Id at 27. See, e.g., H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Michael C. Penn,
Colorization of Films: Painting a Moustache on the "Mona Lisa"?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023
(1990); Michael B. Landau, The Colorization of Black-and-White Motion Pictures: A Grey
Area in the Law, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1161 (1989).
168. Ossola, supra note 164, at 27.
169. Id. at 29. See also John H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77
CAL. L. Rnv. 339 (1989).
170. Ossola, supra note 164, at 29.
171. Id
172. Id.; see also Damich, supra note 15, at 996.
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practitioner and witness before the subcommittee hearing on H.R.
2690,173 believes that eventually moral rights protection will be expanded
to include other works of art.174 Other commentators, however, believe
that moral rights will not and should not extend past their present
state. 175
B. POLITICAL CONTROVERSY
In responding to commentary of Charles D. Ossola,176 representatives
of the Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC) took the
opportunity to state their views on the extension of moral rights beyond
VARA. 177 They first suggest that Mr. Ossola implied that VARA was
enacted in order to comply with the Berne Convention moral rights re-
quirements. 178 In response, the CACC representatives emphasize Con-
gress's implementation of the Berne Convention. Specifically, they point
out that Congress stated that existing laws, both state and federal, satis-
fied article 6bis of the Berne Convention, and that United States law did
not recognize moral rights before or after the Berne Convention was im-
plemented. 179 The CACC representatives further state that the reason
for the limitations on the works covered was not political influence of
industries dealing with copyrightable products but instead was the nature
of the work involved.' 80 Specifically cited is the irreplaceable nature of a
one of a kind work, such as those protected by VARA, contrasted to the
multiple copies of works such as books, movies, and records, and the
often collaborative efforts involved in many of the unprotected works.
181
The authors further suggest that the reason for the concerns of Congress
and the limitations provided in VARA is regard for the objective of the
U.S. Constitution's copyright clause, "ensuring public availability of a
broad array of intellectual and artistic works."' 82 The position is taken by
the CACC, with respect to the future expansion of moral rights protec-
tion in the United States, that Congress made clear in the enactment of
BCIA and VARA that their intention was not to extend these rights in
the future. 183 Furthermore, they state that the public interest will be
173. H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
174. Telephone Interview with John B. Koegel, Esq. (Jan. 3, 1994).
175. See Klipper & Glicksman, supra note 162, at 19.
176. See Ossola, supra note 164.
177. See Klipper & Glicksman, supra note 162.
178. Id at 19.
179. Id at 19. The incongruence of these positions, however, emphasizes the political
fictions under which Congress sometimes operates. See supra notes 9-11 and accompany-
ing text.
180. Klipper & Glicksman, supra note 162, at 19.
181. Id.
182. Id. Although there is certainly merit in the differences suggested by the CACC
representatives and, moreover, there are potential concerns created by these differences, it
is unlikely that the political influence and economic concerns of the large industries in-
volved have not affected the actions of Congress.
183. Id. This may be somewhat of an overstatement with respect to Congress's intent
when implementing the Berne Convention. While Senator Hatch stated that moral rights
causes of action had been rejected previously in the United States, the Committee on the
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harmed by "unduly restricting the free flow of works currently produced
by America's vital copyright system."''8 4
While the CACC addressed the expansion of moral rights to other ar-
eas in responding to Mr. Ossola's commentary, George C. Smith, chief
minority counsel for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology
and the Law, addresses the inappropriateness of the law. 185 Mr. Smith
raises two primary objections to VARA, the effect on private property
rights and the effect on First Amendment free speech rights. Mr. Smith's
commentary first urges that VARA creates an extreme property rights
realignment with respect to the works protected. 186 Moreover, the
American public is presumably going to be saddled with mountains of
unwanted art work.187
Mr. Smith further suggests that VARA restrictions are an assault on
free speech akin to that of the rejected flag protection amendment. 8 8
The commentary urges that an individual should be able to buy a work
which they consider, for example, pornographic, and destroy it as a polit-
ical statement in the same manner that flag burning is permissible as an
expression of free speech. 189 In closing, Mr. Smith expresses his belief
Judiciary of the House of Representatives made clear that the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act was neutral regarding the future of moral rights development in the United
States. See supra notes 9-11.
184. Klipper & Glicksman, supra note 162, at 19.
185. Smith, supra note 163. See Ossola, supra note 164; see Klipper & Glicksman, supra
note 162.
186. Smith, supra note 163, at 23.
187. Id Mr. Smith states that "the attics and basements of America would soon be
overflowing with unwanted 'art' . . ." if all works were protected from destruction. Id. at
24. "Even with the ban on destruction limited to works of recognized stature, disposing of
unwanted art will remain a legally risky business." Id. Mr. Smith further submits that a
tacky frame might be considered a prejudicial modification by a temperamental artist. Id
The commentary states that the "millions of ordinary Americans whose rights are now
restricted are not likely to share the enthusiasm [of the arts community advocates]." Id.
The situations presented by Mr. Smith are extreme. It is unlikely that ordinary Americans,
who find themselves in the position to obtain an original work of art covered by VARA,
are going to choose works they find offensive or that they want to modify in some way.
Moreover, if a person does have a work of unwanted art and is unable to sell or donate it,
the work can simply be returned to the artist. A person who would prefer to destroy or
mutilate a work is probably only being spiteful and the artist arguably has an interest in
preserving the work in light of its personal nature. It is also highly unlikely that a court
would entertain a claim that a tacky frame is prejudicial to the artist's honor and reputa-
tion. Although Mr. Smith's claim that VARA is a dramatic departure from traditional
property law concepts in the United States is true, the fears he raises are arguably of little
concern to most American citizens. Moreover, some commentators believe the general
public is benefitted by the preservation of works of art. See Merryman, supra note 169, at
363.
188. Smith, supra note 163, at 23.
189. Id. Mr. Smith suggests that many Americans would find it odd that they could
burn the flag but not an offensive artwork. Id There are some, however, who would find
this analogy unconvincing. The ability to burn the flag of one's country in protest,
although disturbing at some level to most, is considered a cornerstone of the freedom that
Americans cherish. Buying a piece of privately developed artwork simply to destroy it as a
statement against the artist or the work generally does not rise to the same level. More-
over, the work is a personal statement by the artist who certainly has at least as much right
to that expression as the person who wants to destroy his or her work.
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that "[t]he bizarre irony of this legislative handiwork was entirely lost on
members of the 101st Congress."' 190
C. INTERPRETATION ISSUES
The provisions of VARA have left much open to interpretation by the
courts. For example, the statute provides protection of an artist's work by
creating a right to "prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation.' 191 The statute fails, however, to define what is re-
quired for an act to be intentional or what qualifies as prejudice to an
artist's honor or reputation.' 92 It is unclear whether a person must intend
to prejudice the artist's honor or reputation or only intend to alter the
work.193 Moreover, the statute provides no guidance on what is required
to prove intent or prejudice.' 94
VARA protects a work from destruction only if it is of recognized stat-
ure. 195 The same problem arises in the definition and proof of recognized
stature as arises with regard to prejudice to an artist's honor and reputa-
tion.196 The problem intensifies when the issues are put to a jury.197 The
average layperson juror is not going to be able to determine what is prej-
udice to an artist's honor or reputation or what a work of recognized
stature is in light of the inevitable disagreement of art experts. 98
The provisions of VARA discussed above are probably not the only
provisions subject to interpretation. They are, however, central to the
rights provided by VARA. Therefore, the analysis of just a few key pro-
visions illustrates that the most basic rights provided by VARA will be
undefined until courts shape and define the meanings and requirements
of these and other provisions of VARA. 199
D. WAIVER
A waiver under VARA must be express, in writing, and specifically
indicate the work and uses of the work which are waived. 200 A primary
area of apprehension regarding VARA's waiver provision is caused by
the lack of bargaining power of most artists, which may result in exploita-
tion of the artist.20' The primary argument in favor of the waiver provi-
190. Id.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).




195. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
196. Fein, supra note 192, at G1. Smith, supra note 163, at 23.
197. Fein, supra note 192, at GI.
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 125-59 for a discussion of Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., the only
published case addressing substantive VARA issues.
200. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. V 1993).
201. Request for Information, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,659, 24,661 (1992).
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sion is grounded in common law freedom of contract notions.202 The
public interest in the preservation of works of art is also relevant in the
analysis of the waiver provision.203
Congress recognized the concerns surrounding the waiver provision
from the provision's inception. 2°4 The legislature understood the poten-
tially weak bargaining position of the artist and the possibility that the
law will be eviscerated by the adoption of routine waivers.205 Although
the potential danger of the waiver provision is recognized, Congress be-
lieved that prohibiting waivers would constrain ordinary practices of com-
merce. 206 Professor Jane C. Ginsburg testified before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice that
the best protection for moral rights would be to proscribe waivers.20 7
Professor Ginsburg suggests that prohibiting waiver, however, would
probably be too drastic for the United States legal system and is not re-
quired by the Berne Convention. 20 8 Moreover, Professor Ginsburg fur-
ther testified that "despite their formal prohibition de facto waivers are
likely to occur. The artist is better protected under a regime requiring a
specificity of waivers than under one where an ideologically pure no-
waiver law is rarely in fact observed. '209
Because the waiver provision of VARA is an area of concern, the U.S.
Copyright Office is in the process of conducting a study on the waiver of
moral rights provided by VARA.210 The study and a final report are to
be complete by December 1, 1995.211 An interim report was provided on
December 1, 1992.212
The Copyright Office published a Request for Information on June 10,
1992, in which they provided background of the United States adherence
to the Berne Convention, background of VARA, explanation of the
waiver concerns, and specific questions to which they were seeking an-
swers.213 The first three questions requested input on how and where
information should be gathered in the continuing study.214 Eleven ques-
202. Id. Although unwaivable moral rights protection would be paternalistic, Congress
generally appears more and more willing to be paternalistic in the laws it provides. Con-
tract matters, however, are an area where legislatures and courts are reluctant to interfere
unless the inequality in bargaining power and the resulting exchange is egregious.
203. Id. See also Merryman, supra note 169.




207. Id. Professor Jane C. Ginsburg is from the Columbia University School of Law.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. In VARA, supra note 14, § 608(a)(1), Congress required the Copyright Office to
do a study on the waiver of rights provision. See supra note 58.
211. VARA, supra note 14, § 608(a)(2).
212. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS-
INTERIM REPORT (1992). VARA, supra note 14, § 608(a)(2), requires a progress report not
later than two years after the enactment of VARA.
213. Request for Information, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,659 (1992).
214. Id. at 24,661-662.
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tions were presented dealing specifically with the issue of waivers in con-
tracts with artists.215 These questions were very detailed and if answered
would give a great deal of insight into the effects of VARA's waiver pro-
vision. Unfortunately only seven sets of comments were received in re-
sponse to the Copyright Office's request.216 While the responses do
provide useful information, the questions asked by the Copyright Office
remain essentially unanswered. The responses of the seven parties, how-
ever, are set out below as they provide the most comprehensive source to
date of information on VARA's controversial waiver provision.
The Nebraska Arts Council (NAC) explicitly focused on the questions
presented by the Request for Information.217 They suggest that artists'
awareness and reactions to VARA vary dramatically, as is probably the
case with most segments of American society that are affected by legisla-
tion. Some artists are highly knowledgeable of VARA while others know
nothing of it. The range of reactions runs the gamut from indifference to
intense response. 218 The NAC supports a survey of artists if it involves a
large cross-section of artists from a diverse selection of areas in order to
215. Id. The following questions were asked by the Copyright Office:
1. What constitutes relative equivalence of bargaining power? Do even well-
known artists inherently have unequal bargaining power in dealing [sic] with
established museums and other organizations?
2. Are waivers of moral rights regularly included in artists' contracts? Are
the parties to contracts generally aware of the provisions of the law graniing
integrity and attribution rights to authors? To what extent is any failure of
contract language to mention waivers due to lack of knowledge about the
new law?
3. How specific are the contracts? Are the works sufficiently identified?
Are the uses particularly identified?
4. Do those who secure waivers exercise them or are waivers secured simply
as "insurance policies?"
5. What is the ratio of attribution waivers to waivers of the right to integrity?
Are waivers given for artistic work to be incorporated in buildings propor-
tionately greater than waivers for other works?
6. In what kind of contracts are waivers included-contracts for sale of the
work of art; for copyright ownership; to commission a work of art; stand
alone waivers? Are the waivers limited in time? Do artists find any particu-
lar offers for waiver disturbing?
7. What is the economic effect of the inclusion of a waiver in a contract?
Does the waiver bring a separate price? Is the price of the work or other
thing exchanged for value significantly lower than the market price when
waiver is not included?
8. Does the artist's experience or renown [sic] have any effect on the pres-
ence, absence, or nature of a waiver in a contract? What effect?
9. Do the same factors that influence artists' decisions to waive rights of at-
tribution and integrity influence their decisions to enter into other contracts?
10. Might constitutional problems be created by a new provisions prohibiting
authors from waiving their artists' rights?
11. Do public contracts differ in the extent or nature of waivers offered in
contracts with artists?
Id.
216. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at 7. The text of the report contains a
synopsis of the responses and Appendix 2 contains the actual comments received by the
seven parties.
217. Id. at 7 & app. 2, NAC comments at 1.
218. It at 7-8 & app. 2, NAC comments at 1.
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accurately represent all of the artists of the United States. 219 They fur-
ther suggest that data from foreign countries would not be useful as it
would not have any significant effect on the legislature or the courts in
this country.220
The NAC also responded to the questions relating to artists' contracts
and waiver provision in these contracts.221 They suggest that well known
artists are in a much better bargaining position, with respect to contract
negotiations, than lesser known or unknown artists. Therefore, since it is
riskier to buy the work of a lesser known or unknown artist, these artists
are more likely to have to waive their VARA rights in order to sell their
works.222
The remaining questions were answered by the NAC in the context of
contracts acquiring art under the state's Percent for Art Program.223
Contracts between the NAC and artists do not provide for a waiver of an
artists VARA rights. Moreover, the work is very specifically identified in
the contracts used by the NAC. The contracts leave all rights provided
under federal copyright law, except possession and ownership, in the art-
ist.224 The artist is not allowed to make reproductions of the work; how-
ever, the NAC reserves a license to reproduce the work for
noncommercial purposes as long as it is done "in a tasteful and profes-
sional manner, and the artist is duly credited .... ,,225
The BG-WC Arts Commission, Capital Arts Center (CAG) of Bowling
Green, Kentucky offered the opinion that the waiver should not be used
unscrupulously as bargaining leverage. 226 Artists should be able to make
their own choices without being pressured to waive rights.227 The CAC
representative, however, implies that the law should not be used to pro-
tect an artist from his or her own bad judgment.228
The Art-in-Architecture Program (Program) of the General Service
Administration (GSA) in Washington, D.C. responded to the Copyright
Office's Request for Information with details concerning their treatment
of moral rights in contracts with artists.229 The contract presently used by
219. I& at 8 & app. 2, NAC comments at 1.
220. IM
221. See supra note 215.
222. Id. The NAC's views on the contractual bargaining power of artists are based on
informal discussions with artists in Nebraska. Id. at app. 2, NAC comments at 2.
223. Id. at 8 & app. 2, NAC comments at 2-3. The Nebraska Percent for Arts Program
purchases a work for an intended site for the purpose of the work becoming a modification
to or permanent part of a structure. Id. at 7 & app. 2, NAC comments at 2. The art is not
acquired for commercial purposes. Any profits derived from the sale of items such as
postcards that contain reproductions of the artwork are handled as they would be for a
nonprofit organization. Id at app. 2, NAC comments at 2-3.
224. Id at 8 & app. 2, NAC comments at 2.
225. Id. at 8 & app. 2, NAC comments at 2.
226. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTs, supra note 212, at 9 & app. 2, CAC comments at 1.
227. Id
228. Id at app. 2, CAC comments at 1.
229. Id at 10 & app. 2, GSA comments at 1. The GSA's Art-in Architecture Program
commissions works nationwide for federal buildings. Id.
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the GSA provides rights of attribution and integrity to the artist.230 The
policies and procedures of the Program are presently in the process of
revision in order to reflect VARA.231 Detailed questions on the waiver
of VARA rights are difficult for the GSA to answer until they implement
a waiver option in their contracts with artists. 232 They do make clear,
however, that any waiver they utilize would be knowingly made.2 33 The
GSA is also considering a waiting period of five years after installation of
a work before it could be removed or relocated, except under limited
circumstances. 234 Moreover, the GSA expects to follow a detailed proce-
dure before a work could be removed. 235
The Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC) also re-
sponded to the Copyright Office's Request for Information.236 Instead of
providing information on their experience with waivers or answering the
questions posed by the Copyright Office, the CACC reiterated their posi-
tion that moral rights should not be expanded beyond the limited scope
of VARA.237 Therefore, they recommended that the Copyright Office
limit the scope of its study to the visual works of art covered under
VARA.238 They further warn that any broader study violates the edicts
of Congress.239
A survey of artists was conducted by the Volunteer Lawyers for the
Arts of Massachusetts, Inc. (VLA of MA). 240 Most artists surveyed had
little or no experience with waiver provisions.241 The VLA of MA sug-
gests that it is presently unclear whether artists' lack of experience with
waiver provisions is because VARA is so new and its impact is not yet
known, or because written contracts are rare for the artists covered by
230. Id. The GSA agrees to attribution of the work to the artist at the site of the work
and in any references made to the work by the GSA. They further agree to inspect the
work yearly for proper labeling and damage. Id. at app. 2, GSA comments at 1. The work
becomes governmental property but the artist retains the copyright to the work. Govern-
ment permission is required, however, before the artist can exhibit or reproduce the work.
Id. at 10 at app. 2, GSA comments at 1.
231. Id. at 10 at app. 2, GSA comments at 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at app. 2, GSA comments at 2. The GSA suggests that waiver of the five year
guideline would be permissible if conservation or preservation of the work were involved
or if safety risks were at issue. Id.
235. Id. This provision, if adopted, would provide a sort of procedural due process
protection for the work.
236. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at 11 & app. 2, CACC comments. See
supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text for additional information regarding the inter-
ests represented by the CACC and their positions with respect to moral rights and VARA.
237. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at 11 & app. 2, CACC comments at 1.
238. Id. at 11 & app. 2, CACC comments at 1-2.
239. Id. at 11 & app. 2, CACC comments at 3.
240. Id. at 12 & app. 2, VLA of MA comments at 1. VLA of MA is "a non-profit
organization established to provide access to legal services, and advocacy, for artists and
non-profit cultural organizations." Id. The artists surveyed were "well established, working
artists with local and regional reputations." Id. at app. 2, VLA of MA comments at 1.
Approximately 60 surveys were distributed and 22 completed surveys were received. Id. at
12 & app. 2, VLA of MA comments at 1.
241. Id. at 12 & app. 2, VLA of MA comments at 2.
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VARA.242 On the issue of waiver, most artists surveyed said they would
not waive their moral rights.243 The factors that would affect an artist's
decision to waive moral rights include money, opportunity, and whether
or not the work was commissioned, public, or a temporary piece.244
The Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (VLA) opposes the waiver provi-
sion of VARA and believes that it should be abolished.245 VLA assert
that VARA is undermined by the fact that artists may be compelled, pos-
sibly unknowingly, to surrender their moral rights.246 Moreover, they
suggest that the waiver provision violates "the spirit of the Berne Con-
vention .... -247 According to the VLA's comments, the potential dam-
age resulting from the waiver provision cannot be quantified at this early
date.248 An informal survey of New York City practicing lawyers, con-
ducted by the VLA, suggests that experience is limited with respect to
waiver of moral rights in artists' contracts.249 The VLA suggests that this
is due to a lack of knowledge by museums and galleries.250 Moreover,
they urge that it is simply a matter of time before waiver provisions find
their way into artists' contracts. 251 The VLA further submits that due to
artists' lack of bargaining clout they will be unable to avoid waiver provi-
sions and in addition would obtain nothing in return for their waiver.252
Congress should, the VLA suggests, provide safeguards due to artists'
lack of bargaining power by repealing VARA's waiver provision.253 Ad-
ditionally, they urge that the public policy of encouraging creativity sup-
ports the repeal of the waiver provision.254
John Henry Merryman, Sweitzer Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford
University, responded to the Copyright Office's inquiries regarding
waiver of moral rights provided by VARA.255 Professor Merryman
stated that moral rights protection serves either the artist's interest alone,
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Some artists who responded that they would never be willing to waive their
moral rights nevertheless provided factors which should influence their decision with re-
spect to waiver of moral rights.
245. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at 12-13 & app. 2, VLA comments at 1.
VLA is a non-profit New York organization "which provides free arts-related legal assist-
ance and education to artists and arts organizations in all creative fields otherwise unable
to afford such services." Id. at app. 2, VLA comments at 1.
246. Id. at app. 2, VLA comments at 1.
247. Id. (quoting STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOR-
ING RIGHTS 514 (2d ed. 1989)).





253. Itd at app. 2, VLA comments at 2-3.
254. I.
255. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at 9 & app. 2, Merryman comments.
Professor Merryman has written extensively on art and the law, including the issue of art-
ist's moral rights. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property,
77 CAL. L. REV. 339 (1989); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHics,
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 142-47 (2d ed. 1987); John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of
Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976).
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or a mixture of the artist's and the public's interest.256 He observed that
VARA appears to secure moral rights only for the artist.257 If the intent
of Congress was to protect only the artist's interest then Professor Mer-
ryman finds the waiver provision of VARA reasonable. 258 On the issue
of protecting artists from exploitation as a result of unequal bargaining
power, Professor Merryman states that based on his "experience these
concerns are vastly exaggerated by sentimentalists whose fervor is in-
versely proportional to their familiarity with the art world. '259 Professor
Merryman does suggest, however, that if the public's interest is protected,
as in the California Cultural and Artistic Creations Preservation Act,260
the artist's wavier ability should be limited to the artist's interest.26'
On the use of waivers in contracts, Professor Merryman states that
most artist usually do not have written agreements when they sell or con-
sign their works.262 Those who do use written contracts generally have
dealers who are able to adequately protect the artist's interest.263 Fur-
thermore, artists seem to have an aversion to written contracts.264 These
observations of Professor Merryman are based on "impressionistic
evidence."265
Although the waiver provision has not been given extensive attention,
some commentators have addressed the subject. One commentator sug-
gests that if courts do not void waivers, in at least some situations, the
rights provided by VARA would be meaningless. 266 The possibility that a
waiver may be voided, however, could negatively affect a protected
work's market price.267 The commentator ultimately reaches the conclu-
sion that VARA is a futile and inexact law which will benefit only
lawyers.268
Another commentator suggests that VARA does not fully meet article
6bis of the Berne Convention. 269 Article 6bis does not explicitly state
that moral rights are unwaivable and inalienable, however, it has been





260. CAL. CIV. CODE § 989 (West Supp. 1991).
261. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 212, at app. 2, Merryman comments at 1.
262. Id. at 9 and app. 2, Merryman comments at 1-2.
263. Id. at 9 & app. 2, Merryman comments at 2.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 9 & app. 2, Merryman comments at 1.
266. Fein, supra note 192, at G1.
267. Id.
268. Id. The commentator's conclusion is based on concerns over the waiver provision
and interpretation problems which will probably arise in litigation of the statute. Id. See
supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
269. Damich, supra note 15, at 947. Professor Damich has also written on the subject of
the United States adherence to the Berne Convention with respect to article 6bis. Further-
more, he testified at the subcommittee's hearings regarding United States adherence to the
Berne Convention. See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article
6bis of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 655
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suggested that this meaning is implied from the language. 270 Moreover,
the official interpretation comments provided by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) support the concept that article 6bis pro-
tects artists even from themselves. 271
The fact that most artists are without substantial bargaining power is
not seriously debated by anyone. How to deal with this problem in light
of the United States strong tradition of freedom of contract, however, is
debated. One commentator suggests that the inequity in bargaining
power places artists in a category that has traditionally allowed limita-
tions on freedom of contract.272 Since VARA covers such a narrow
group of works, the commentator urges that inalienable and unwaivable
rights under VARA are easier to justify because the difficult cases, which
would arise with other artistic works, do not arise under VARA. 273
Moreover, the practical considerations addressed by the VARA provi-
sions dealing with destruction and buildings provide additional justifica-
tion for inalienable and unwaivable VARA rights.274 The commentator
further suggests that, in light of the deficiencies of VARA, its preemption
provision should be interpreted narrowly in order to continue the
broader protection provided by state moral rights statutes. 275 After all,
these laws were cited in the BCIA as part of the reason why the United
States already complied with article 6bis of the Berne Convention.276
As is obvious from the above discussion, the waiver provision is be-
lieved by some to be appropriate and by others to destroy the substance
of the law. The study by the Copyright Office does not yet provide any
real insight into who is correct. The study continues, however, until De-
cember of 1995. Hopefully, the results will provide Congress with the
kind of information needed to make an intelligent decision on VARA's
waiver provision. We should be hesitant in drawing conclusions on the
ultimate effects of the waiver provision, particularly in light of the limited
information presently available and the conflicting opinions on the sub-
ject. The gut instinct of most would probably be that the waiver provi-
sion will be unfair to the "starving artist." If most artists do not use
written agreements, however, the waiver provision is not an issue. Even
if the waiver provision is unfair to artists, how unfair does it have to be
before Congress will be willing to limit the freedom of an artist and a
buyer to contract?
(1986); HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, BERNE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION
ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
270. Damich, supra note 15, at 967.
271. Id. at 947, 967.
272. Id. at 967 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COTRACrs § 208 (1981) on uncon-
scionability). Professor Damich stated that this is the reason why the power of termination
was made inalienable in the Copyright Act. Id. at 967 & n.110.
273. Id. at 968. Examples of difficult cases include adaptation and editing. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 947-48.
276. Id See supra note 9.
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The ultimate solution to the waiver provision debate may lie some-
where between an unfettered waiver provision and a paternalistic prohi-
bition of waivers. Congress commonly provides extra protection for a
weaker party without completely removing the right to contract. 277 For
example, consumer protection laws allow contracting while protecting the
consumer from unfair sellers.278 The same concept could be applied to
protect the artist under VARA. For example, the buyer of an artist's
work could be required to provide additional consideration for a waiver
above and beyond the price of the work. Because courts are generally
reluctant to question the adequacy of consideration unless it is egre-
giously unfair, Congress could define a minimum reasonable considera-
tion for a waiver to allow consistency in determining what is fair.279 This
reasonable consideration could be based on, for example, a percentage of
the selling price of the work. Arguably, a buyer could manipulate the
price under this scheme to make the amount paid for the waiver and the
work together no more than the buyer would have actually paid for the
work. This waiver consideration scheme, however, would still provide
'more protection for the artist, particularly because evidence as to the
work's value could be reviewed. Moreover, if the artist's asking price is
substantially less than the selling price, a court's suspicion should be
raised and the transaction should be carefully reviewed. Because VARA
rights are not assignable or transferable, 280 a subsequent owner of a work
would have to negotiate with the artist to get a new waiver. Presumably,
the artist would have been paid for the first waiver, therefore, considera-
tion for subsequent waivers should not be necessary for the subsequent
waiver to be valid.
A final suggestion for modification of VARA's waiver provision in-
volves the contract policing doctrine of unconscionability. 281 While un-
conscionability is somewhat undefined282 it "has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party. '283 Courts are generally unwilling to apply
the doctrine of unconscionability unless the situation is egregious. 284
Therefore, while unconscionability would provide a means of protecting
the artist under VARA, it is unlikely that the courts will apply this doc-
trine except in the most extreme cases. Moreover, uniformity of results, a
primary purpose of VARA,285 would very likely be sacrificed as each
court defined unconscionability. The doctrine of unconscionability could,
277. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 4.29 (2d ed. 1990).
278. Id.
279. Id. § 2.11.
280. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. V 1993).
281. Id. § 4.28.
282. FARNSWORTH, supra note 277, § 4.28, at 327.
283. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
284. FARNSWORTH, supra note 277, § 4.28, at 335.
285. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6931.
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however, be applied uniformly if Congress defined the requirements for a
waiver provision to be unconscionable. This option would leave the
waiver provision very much like it is but would provide courts with gui-
dance on policing these provisions.
While the above suggestions may not be free from potential problems,
they do suggest that there is a middle ground somewhere between the
two extreme positions regarding the waiver provision. The legislative
process requires that Congress balance interests and devise a solution
that is a reasonable compromise between those interests. There is no rea-
son to believe that Congress cannot or should not provide a waiver provi-
sion that is fair to all parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
VARA is a relatively new law with many unresolved issues. Courts
have barely begun the statutory interpretation process. Moreover, the
future of VARA's waiver provision is unclear. The present waiver provi-
sion, if heavily used, could eviscerate any meaningful protection under
VARA. The art community could, however, largely ignore the waiver
provision, resulting in minimal impact on VARA rights. Additionally,
there is debate whether this is the beginning of broader moral rights pro-
tection in the United States or merely an isolated niche. As the issues are
resolved, VARA will either become a powerful protection for a small
group of artists or a useless addition to copyright law.
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